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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
VOL. XXII

SUMMER 1969

NO. 1

FISCAL INCENTIVES TO INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET*
ELIEZER ERELI* *

Fiscal incentives to industrial development aim at its stimulation by attracting capital and channeling investment into industrial ventures." Such
incentives usually comprise exemptions from custom duties and related charges
on the importation of machinery, industrial raw materials and containers,
as well as from taxes on income, profits, property, and capital.2 Contained in
the domestic legislation of most developing nations, these incentives are of
particular importance to Central America, appearing there as early as 1939. 3
Because of the low per capita income and the numerically small population
of each national market, the industrial basis of the area rests primarily on
few traditional activities such as food, cloth, and furniture produced in
small-scale establishments.4 The manufacturing sector is therefore unable to
provide employment to a population whose growth rate is one of the highest
in the world, aggravated by a constant migration from the rural areas to the
urban centers. 5 The modernization of existing industries and the development of new ones are thus of prime importance, both nationally and regionally, and the requirement of further investment to achieve these ends renders
fiscal incentives to industrial development both desirable and necessary. 6
*A Table of Headings and Subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
" Visiting Professor, Bates College of Law, University of Houston.
1. See generally J. HELER & K. KAUFFMiAN, TAX INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY IN LESS DEVELoPE I COUNTRIES (1963); 3. PINCUS, THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT LAWS OF CENTRAL
AEumuc (1961); S. Ross & J. CmusrEIsEN, TAx INCENTIVES IN MEXICo (1959); Meier, LegalEconomic Problems of Private Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 33 U. CHI. L.
REv. 463 (1966); Mendive, Tax Incentives in Latin America, 9 ECON. BULL. LATIN AMERICA
103 (1964).
2. 32 U.N. ECOSOC, Annex IV, Doc. E/3492 (1961); (list of investment laws); L.
Locmit'y, A GUIDE TO MARKET DATA IN CENTRAL AMERICA 73-76 (1964)

(summary of Central

America's investment legislation); J. PINcUs, supra note 1, at 33-58 (summary of Central
America's investment legislation).
3. In order of appearance: El Salvador (1939), Costa Rica (1940), Guatemala (1947),
Nicaragua (1955), Honduras (1958). J. PINCUS, supra note 1, at 7.
4.

AGENCY

FOR INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT, Directorio Industrial Centroamericano

(1965) (list of enterprises and number of employees); SecretariaPermanente del Tratado General de Integracion Economica Centroamericana (SIECA) 86 CARTA INFORMATIVA 26-27 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as CARTA] (majority of industrial enterprises are in traditional activities
and employ fewer than ten employees).
5. J. PINCUs, supra note 1, at 4; 86 CARTA, Annexo Estadistica (1968) reports a 3.52%
annual increase of population between 1960 and 1967.
6. ECLA-SIECA, Central America: Industrial Policy Problems, 9 EcoN. BULL. LATIN
AMERICA 117 (1964).

[175]
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On the other hand, the diversity of national incentives and their unilateral
concession may retard the objectives of the area's economic integration. The
Central American Common Market (CACM) established in 1960, and composed of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica,
aims at eliminating the duplication of investments and the consequent waste
of resources inherent in diverse national markets.7 Yet, competition between
CACM members for scarce capital by inflating fiscal incentives, could only
lead to a loss of foreign exchange and domestic revenue by each and to the
waste of resources from a regional point of view.s
The Common Market also adopted a uniform external tariff against thirdcountry products and provided for the free movement of regional goods within the Market so as to stimulate the development of new productive activities not hitherto feasible.9 Unilateral exemptions from custom duties could,
however, subvert the regional industrial policy embodied in the equalized
tariff.10 Similarly, regional free trade could cause a product produced from
inputs, which are imported duty free because of fiscal incentives, to affect
adversely the competitive position of a similar article using regional raw
materials, and thus impair the utility of both free trade and an equalized
tariff in stimulating industrialization."
Hence, the emergence of the Common Market requires some restriction on
the freedom of members to differ on the amount of and the eligibility for
fiscal incentives, so that the area's integration will indeed eliminate waste
of resources and promote industrial investment while assuring fair competition between regional products. The techniques employed to that effect
by the CACM organs are thus of importance to its ultimate success and
should be of interest to any present or future investor in the Market.12

7.

See generally C.

(1966);
(1967);
J. PINCUS, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (1962); Ereli, The Central American
Common Market: Integration in Practice, 43 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1968).
R.

HANSEN,

CASTILLO,

CENTRAL AMERIcA:

GROWTH AND INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

8. Meier, supra note 1, at 477-88.
competition for capital by use of fiscal
industries in each country, devoted to
importation of industrial components
minimizing the efficiency of incentives.

AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The combination of a high tariff on luxuries and
incentives also leads to the establishment of similar
nonessential production that is dependent on the
and raw materials, thus escalating the cost and
Foreign Private Investment in Latin America at 7,

U.N. Doc. E/CM 12/755/Rev. 1 (1961); SIECA, Informe de las Industrias Clasificadas en
los Poises Centroamericanos Doc. D-11/128 (1966); R. HANSEN, supra note 7, at 32.
9.

INTERAMERICAN

INSTITUTE OF

INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL STUDIES,

INSTRUMENTS

RELATING

(1968) (1958 Agreement on the
Equalization of Import Charges) [hereinafter cited as INSTRUMENTS].
10. During 1962, e.g., exempted imports amounted to about 30% of total imports. U.N.
TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

OF LATIN AMERICA 79

ECLA, EVALUCION DE LA INTEGRACTION ECONOMICA EN CENTROAMERICA at 48 [hereinafter
cited as EVALUATION] Doc. E/CN. 12/CCE/762 (1966).
11. Most of the obstacles to free trade resulted from disputes about the origin of products produced from parts imported free of duty. SIECA, El problema de origen en Mercado

Comun CentroamericanoDoc. CE-XXXIII/D.1.1 (1968).
12.

Annual United States private investment in

Central America

increased from $20

million in 1960 to about $60 million in 1966. Central American Common Market, 10
WORLD Bus. 14,

15 (1968). The value of American direct investment in the area increased
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A discussion of fiscal incentives within CACM must refer to its organs
as well as to various treaties, hence a short summary of the main features of
the various instruments and bodies that constitute the Market may prove
helpful.
The impetus to economic integration in Central America started with
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),
which, in 1950, advocated the expansion of regional trade in order to achieve
a greater degree of industrialization and a higher rate of productivity and
income.yl This approach coincided with Central America's experimentation in
closer political ties and the economic stagnation caused by falling commodity
prices. Hence, in 1951 the Central American Republics asked ECLA's cooperation in promoting the integration of their economies. In 1958 the
cooperation culminated in two basic treaties: The Multilateral Treaty on
Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration and the Agreement
on the Regime of Central American Integration Industries.14 The Multilateral
Treaty contained a list of items that would enjoy free trade among the
parties and a promise to study and negotiate additional liberalization. It also
envisaged the conclusion, within a year, of an agreement to equalize import
duties. The Agreement on the Integration Industries supplemented the
Multilateral Treaty by providing a framework whereby the parties could
agree, by additional protocols, to free trade and equalized tariffs in the
context of a given industry, without awaiting the more general liberalization
pursuant to the Multilateral Treaty or the custom equalization agreement
yet to be draftedY5
As all these instruments provided for further agreements on liberalization
and equalization, the three neighbors -Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras - decided to hasten their integration and signed a Treaty of Economic
Association in February 1960.16 Fearing economic isolation, Nicaragua called
an extraordinary meeting of all the signatories to the Multilateral Treaty,
the result of which was a request that the ECLA draft a convention for an
accelerated economic integration. 7 This document, the 1960 General Treaty
on Central American Economic Integration,1s left intact the 1958 Agreement
on Integration Industries and the 1959 Agreement on the Equalization of
Import Charges. It provided, however, for free trade in all the products
I

from $376 million in 1960 to $536 million in 1965. Wionczek, La inversion Privada Norteamerican y el Desarollo de Mesoamerica, 18 COMERc= EXTERIOR 671, 680 table 1 (1968).
13. See generally authorities cited note 7 supra.
14. Text of the Treaty and Agreement in INSTRUMENTS 3, 89.

15. In 1959 the parties signed the Agreement on the Equalization of Import Charges,
which required additional protocols for implementation. For further discussion of the
integration industries scheme see Ereli, supra note 7, at 24-29 and authorities cited at 25 n.
118.
16. Text in INSTRUMENTS 16.
17. S. DELL, A LAxINu AMmucAN COMMON MAuK i~? 56 (1966).
18. Text in INSTRUMENTS 23.
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originating in the territories of the signatories, unless expressly reserved in
Annex A to the Treaty.19
Annex A to the Treaty specifies, first, the goods excluded from free trade
and second, the restrictions the members may impose on these items. The
exceptions were to terminate automatically by June 1966, the end of the
fifth year during which the Treaty was in force, unless the contrary was
specifically provided in the Annex. Thus, since 1966 about ninety-four percent of the goods classified in the Central American tariff schedule have been
in free trade, while about twenty-five items remain in the Annex.2 0 Of the
latter, only five- sugar, coffee, rum, petroleum products, and ethyl alcoholare restricted by all countries. Trade in other items is limited only between
one or more pair of countries and is free among the others. The type of restrictions and their duration also vary between members and items. Some
are subject to import charges and duties, others are in free trade, but the
amounts of goods imported freely are restricted, and some are granted preferential treatment vis-A-vis nonregional goods. These restrictions are either
indefinite or will terminate when a special convention is signed. Additionally,
as of 1966 only one-fifth of imports- basically composed of wheat and flour,
petroleum and its derivatives, automobiles and electrical appliances - remained unequalized.2 1 This liberalization of trade and equalization of tariffs
increased the volume of intraregional commerce and its share of the area's
total trade and, as important, shifted the main composition of the exchange
from primary products to semi-finished and light industrial goods.22
The General Treaty further provides for an Economic Council, composed
of the Ministers of Economy of each member, to direct the integration of the
Central American economies and to coordinate the policies of the members
in economic matters. The application and administration of the treaty, as
well as the other agreements relating to the area's economic integration, are
in the charge of an Executive Council composed of one permanent member
and one alternate designated by each of the parties. A Permanent Secretariat
serves both Councils, watches over the correct application of the economic
integration treaties, and sees to it that the resolutions of both councils are
implemented. The Executive Council decides issues by a majority vote of all
the members, and if unable to reach a decision the matter is to be submitted
to the Economic Council.23 The latter must first make a unanimous determination whether to resolve the issue by a unanimous vote or simple ma19. The text of Annex A is in SIECA, I CONVENIOS CENTROAMERICANOS DE INTECRACION
ECONONIICA 67 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CONVENIOS].
20. SIECA, CINco ANOS DE LA iORES EN LA IN'rGRACION ECONOMICA CENTROAMERICANA
40-42 (1966). See also SIECA Doc. SMC/DI/3-66

(1966)

(list of items still subject to re(1967)

strictions); V. WATKIN, TAXES AND TAx HARMONIZATION IN CENTRAL A,,IERCA 81-89
(list of items still subject to restrictions).

21.

75

22. 89

CARTA

21 (1968).

26-28 (1969) (comparison of regional trade 1964-1967); 93 CARTA 18-19
(1969) (comparison of regional trade, 1961-1968).
23. The Economic Council interpreted its powers also to include appeals from the
resolutions of the Executive Council. SIECA, Informe de la Reunion at 16, Doc. CE-GT.
Reg. Conf/Inf. (1968). See also note 24 infra.
CARTA

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss2/1
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jority - a procedure similar to the double veto of the United Nations' Security Council. The General Treaty also provides that if neither council can
reach agreement, members shall submit their differences regarding the interpretation or application of any of the treaty's provisions to arbitration and
specifies the method of constituting the Arbitration Tribunal. So far no
case has been submitted to arbitration, and only few appeals have reached
the Economic Council since the Executive Council usually arrives at a decision. It is most unlikely that the Economic Council, with its unanimity rule,
24
could overrule a decision of the Executive Council.
FISCAL INCENTIVES IN THE

1960

GENERAL TREATY

The 1958 Multilateral Treaty already contemplated the equalization of
fiscal incentives, but its directive was neither firm nor all encompassing. The
signatories merely undertook, according to article V, to "endeavour" to
equalize the advantages granted by them to industries producing articles that
were in free trade, and only to the extent that such benefits entailed unfair
competition in such goods. Article XIX of the 1960 General Treaty, on the
other hand, called for an agreement, within six months from the date of the
treaty's entry into force, to standardize fiscal benefits to industrial development and entrusted the Executive Council with the responsibility for coordinating the application of the uniform incentives. This provision resulted
in the 1962 Agreement on Fiscal Incentives to Industrial Development, as
25
amended by a 1966 Protocol on Preferential Treatment for Honduras.
Additionally, the General Treaty refers to fiscal incentives in chapter III,
dealing with export subsidies and unfair trade practices, and distinguishes
between tax incentives and custom exemptions.
Taxes
Article XI of the General Treaty is similar to that of the 1958 Multilateral
Treaty and provides that tax exemptions of a general nature aimed at stimulating production do not constitute a prohibited export subsidy. The article
also allows "exemptions from internal taxes on the production, sales, or consumption levied in the exporting country on the goods exported to the territory of another State." If limited to exports, rather than of a general nature,
the exemptions from local excise taxes may lead to a two-price system-the
hallmark of a prohibited export subsidy--one in the market where the goods
are produced and a lower price when exported. The alternative, however, is
24. Thus, e.g., resolution 30 of the Economic Council modified, at the request of
Guatemala, resolution 36 of the Executive Council, which set permissible discounts to
dealers of tires and tubes produced by the integration industry. SIECA, Acta No. 19, CEC,
17-18 (1966). In its resolution 82, the Economic Council approved resolution 41 of the
Executive Council relating to custom equalizations. The vote was 4-1, but the Economic
Council decided at the outset pursuant to article XX to solve the dispute by a majority
vote. Id. at 20-21. Thus, the Economic Council applied the voting procedure of article
XX to cases appealed from the Executive Council where the ltter resolved the issue.
25. Text in INSmumEN'rs 117, 135.
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the possibility that regional goods would be doubly taxed, once by the exporting member and again by the importing state. Such cumulative payments
could only retard the free flow of regional trade by rendering regional products more expensive in the importer's market than in that of the exporter.
To avoid such a barrier to regional trade, either the importing member
should not tax regional goods or the exporting member should be able to
exempt exports from his internal taxes. Since the Central American countries
derive their revenues primarily from import duties and taxes, 26 they refused
to relinquish both and retained, pursuant to article VI, authority to tax
regional imports. Hence, article XI should be read as permitting exemptions
from the excise taxes of the exporting member even if limited to exports
because such an interpretation tends to enhance one of the main reasons for
creating the Common Market; namely, the free circulation of regional goods.27
Article XI of the 1960 General Treaty allows "exemptions" from local
taxes, in contradistinction to its predecessor in the 1958 Multilateral Treaty
permitting "exemptions or refunds." Hence, the later text could be interpreted as prohibiting tax rebates, preventing thereby the so-called "drawback
system," which reimburses local taxes paid if the products are exported.2 8
The prohibition on refunds may require members to exempt industries from
local taxes, but collect them if the products are sold locally rather than exported, a procedure that may prove more difficult to administer than the
drawback system.2 9 On the other hand, the elimination of refunds from the
General Treaty could mean that the term "exemptions" includes tax rebates,
and hence the latter need not be specifically mentioned. Since the function
of article XI's tax exemption is to enhance regional trade by avoiding multiple local taxation of regional goods, members should be free to select the
means that prove convenient to administer or that are most effective in preventing double taxation.30 Therefore, the inclusion of refunds within the
term "exemptions" seems preferable to the narrower definition of the latter.
Custom Duties Exemptions
In contradistinction to article XI's latitude toward tax exemptions, article
IX views exemptions from custom duties and related charges, granted to
about a third of imports, as possible unfair trade practices. 3 1 Specifically,
32
article IX provides:

26. V. WATKIN 68 (table showing consumption tax in proportion to total revenue).
27.

28.
29.
SIECA
30.
31.

INSTRUMENTS arts. I-III, at 23-24.

Fiscal Incentives for Exports, 12 ECON. BULL. LATIN AMERICA 33, 41 (1967).
See, e.g., the Guatemalan procedure for tax exemption to cigarettes reported in
Doc. CE-XXIII/D.T. 8 (1966).
See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
EVALUACION, supra note 10, at 48.

32. The exemption of government imports from the reach of article IX is modified
by article 42 of the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives, which reads: "Governments, autonomous or decentralized state institutions, municipalities, and all the public agencies of the
contracting Parties shall give preference, in their purchases, to products of Central American
industry, provided that the price of the products is equal to or below the price of imported

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss2/1
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The governments of the signatory States shall not grant exemptions
or reductions in custom tariffs to imports coming from outside Central
America when the articles concerned are produced in the contracting
States under adequate conditions.
When a signatory State considers it is affected by the granting of
custom exemptions for imports, or by government imports which are
not intended for the use of the government'itself or of its institutions,
it may submit the problem to the Executive Council, which shall consider it and come to a decision in the matter.
To clarify the meaning of "adequate conditions" required by the article,
the Executive Council indicated that it would take into consideration the
adequacy of supply, price, and quality.3 3 It also suggested that members furnish to the Secretariat, for distribution to other members, a list of products
they produced together with information relating to productive capacity,
effective production, quality, and prices, which the appropriate authorities
should consult before granting custom exemptions.3 4 In practice, however,
the Executive Council tended to interpret the adequacy criteria in favor of
regional products in order to promote their utilization and reduce the widespread resort to custom exemptions. Thus, the Council imposed on the member granting exemptions the burden of proving that regional production was
inadequate and in case of doubt favored a finding of adequacy.35 The Council
also prohibited custom exemptions for imports that were not produced in the
Market, such as coconut oil, when a regional substitute, cotton seed oil, proved
available.30 In determining the adequacy of supply, the Council selected the
standard for the adequacy of installed capacity rather than the actual or
effective production.3 7 Similarly, in comparing prices, the Council decided to
ignore the terms of payment that usually favor the extra-regional product
but to take into account the CIF cost, as well as custom duties and related
charges that the regional product does not usually pay.3 8 In order to minimize
the competitive disadvantages of the more expensive regional substitute the
Secretariat further suggested that the Council prohibit custom exemptions
even though such price comparison still favored the foreign product.39
products, and that their quality is comparable. For the purpose of comparing prices, fifty
percent of the import charges, related duties, and other costs of entry shall be considered
to be components of the price of the non-Central American product, even when the entity
acquiring the product is exempt from paying such import charges."
33. Resolution 26, SIECA, 8 AcrA DEL CONSEjo EJuCATIvo 16-18 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as AcrA]. See also note 32 supra.
34. Resolution 26, note 33 supra. See also SIEGA Doc. CE-XXII/D.T. 6-A (1966) (questionnaire for furnishing information); 75 CARTA, supra note 4, at 18-19 (1968) (list of 26
products for 1967).
35. Resolution 26, note 33 supra.
36. 24 AcTA 15-16 (1966); SIECA Doc. CE-XXIV/D.T. 16 (1966) (SIECA's report).
37. Resolution 14, 4 AcrA 17, 12-15 (dissent) (1963); SIECA Doc. CE-II/D.T. 7 (1962)
(SIECA's report).
38. SIECA Doc. CE-XXIV/D.T. 14 (1966) (SIECA's comparison of cement prices); 62
CARTA 11 (1966) (council's resolution). See also note 32 supra (price comparison for governmental purchases).
39. SIECA Doc. CE-SSIV/D.T. 17 (1966).
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The Executive Council also dealt with the competitive advantages of dutyfree imports in the context of other provisions of the General Treaty, such
as, articles III and V relating to origin and article VI regulating the taxation
of regional products. Article III requires goods to originate in CACM in
order to enjoy the benefits of free trade while, according to article V, goods
cannot originate in the Market if imported from a third country and simply
40
assembled, wrapped, packed, or diluted in the territory of a member. Most
of the disputes involving origin originated from custom exemptions that
could not be prohibited under article IX, for example, glasses imported duty
free, decorated and distributed regionally, threatened regional glasses whose
production was just beginning and therefore was unable to satisfy the adequacy
requirement of article IX. 4 1 Despite the Secretariat's opinions that the goods
originated in the market, since not simply assembled, packed, wrapped, or
diluted, the Council often denied free trade to these products. The Council's
resolutions referred to article III requiring origin, rather than to article V criteria, thereby indicating that a product may lack origin even though immune
from article V's stipulations.42 Article VI, in turn, prohibits a member from
taxing regional goods unless it taxes similar local products or obtains the
Council's authorization. The latter granted requests to tax regional imports
in order to equalize competition as, for example, the authorization to tax
regional matches produced from paper imported with custom exemptions, in
order to overcome the competitive disadvantages of matches utilizing regional
wood.

43

Thus, the General Treaty allowed tax stimulants to industrial investment
and only attempted to regulate custom exemptions when regional substitutes proved available. Although the Executive Council attempted to limit
duty-free imports under other provisions, it could neither regulate the
content of national fiscal incentives nor their unilateral concession except by
44
an agreement contemplated in article XIX.

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON FISCAL INCENTIVES TO
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Agreement on Fiscal Incentives to Industrial Development, signed
in 1962 pursuant to article XIX of the General Treaty, and its 1966 Protocol
on Preferential Treatment for Honduras, became effective in 1969, eight
45
days after the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification. The delay re40. See generally S. GREEN & K. GABRIEL, RULES OF ORIGIN (2d ed. 1967); SIECA, El
Problema de Origen en Mercado Comun Centroamericano Doc. CE/XXXIII/D. 1.1 (1968);
Ereli, supra note 7, at 10-14.
41.

Resolution 61, 24 AcTA 13 (1966); SIECA Doc. CE-XXIV/D.T. 15 (1966) (SIECA's

report).
42. Note 41 supra; Ereli, supra note 7, at 13-14. Indeed, the Council refused so far to
adopt rules for the definition of origin, preferring a case-by-case solution. SIECA note 40
supra; SIECA Doc. CE-XIX/94 (1965) (draft regulations for determining origin).
43. Resolution 6, 2 AcTA 5 (1962). See generally Ereli, supra note 7, at 15-17.
44. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
45. Article 43, INSTRUMENTS, 130; 90 CARTA 14 (1969) (final ratification). The duration
of the Agreement according to article 45 is contingent upon that of the General Treaty.
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sulted first, from a demand by Honduras for more favorable treatment than
that accorded by the Agreement, on the ground of being the least developed
and second, from the reluctance of some members to sign and ratify such a
preference. The Agreement and Protocol are to be supplemented by regulations drawn by the Executive Council and adopted by all members not later
46
than thirty days from the date on which the Agreement became effective.
During 1964 and 1965 the Council discussed some fifty-seven regulations, but
so far the final version of the Regulations has not appeared.47 Hence, any reference to the Regulations is tentative, since the 1964-1965 draft may be
completely revised by the final version.
Applicability
While article XIX of the General Treaty calls for uniform fiscal incentives to "industrial development," the Agreement applies only to the establishnent and the expansion of "manufacturing industries," leaving national
incentives to govern enumerated activities that do not qualify as "manufacturing."48 According to article 3 of the Agreement, the following may be
regulated by laws or provisions of a national character:4 9
(a) Mineral-extracting industries;
(b) Industries extracting petroleum and natural gas;
(c) Forestry and the extraction of lumber;
(d) Pisciculture and fishing;
(e) Service industries and activities;
(f) Agricultural activities; and
(g) The construction of low-cost housing. In this case it will be
possible to grant exemptions from customs on imports of construction
materials only when Central America substitutes adequate in quality,
quantity, and price are not available.
These activities, however, do not include "typically manufacturing processing of the products obtained," which, like all manufacturing industries,
are to be controlled by the Agreement.
The latter is valid for 20 years and thereafter is indefinitely renewable. After the expiration
of the 20 years, the Treaty may be denounced 5 years after notice to that effect, but remains valid between the nondenouncing members as long as at least 2 members remain.
Article XXXI, INSTRUMENTS 34. The Protocol to the Agreement is for 5 years, but may be
extended by the Economic Council. Article 19, INSTRUaMENTS 140.
46. Article 47 of the Agreement, INSTRUMENTS 130.
47. The discussion and the draft regulations appear in 8 AcTA 4-14 (discussion) and
Annexes (text) (1964), 13 AcrA 7-11 (discussion and text), and annex 2 (text) (1965). A
letter dated Oct. 3, 1969, No. DD03992 from Sr. Salvador Sanchez Aguillon h., Director of
the Development Division, indicates that the Executive Council has not as yet approved
the Regulations and that thereafter "the Regulations would pass to the Central American
Economic Council for its final approval." The letter writer does not estimate the date for
the Economic Council's action nor when the Executive Council would approve the
Regulations.
48. Article 2, INSTRUMENTS l1.
49. Id.
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The special category of low-cost housing in paragraph (g) could be construed to mean that other construction activities do not qualify for national
incentives and, not being manufacturing industries, also could not receive the
Agreement's benefits, yet, construction activities such as schools, hospitals,
roads, ports, bridges, dams, or power stations are important to the area's
social and economic infrastructure and should be encouraged as much as possible. Indeed, article XVI of the General Treaty singles out construction firms
for equality of treatment with domestic concerns for works tending to promote the development of Central America. Hence, the category of service
industries and activities in paragraph (e) of article 3 could, and should,
encompass any construction, particularly since no other activity subject
to national incentives pursuant to article 3, except for construction of
low-cost housing, could utilize custom exemptions for the importation
of construction materials. This conclusion is supported by paragraph (g) that
only low-cost housing could benefit from exemptions on imports of construction materials if no adequate regional substitutes are available. More-

over, this conclusion conforms to another provision of the Agreement that
enterprises classified under national law of industrial development before
the Agreement becomes effective will continue to enjoy national benefits, but
not concessions for the importation of construction materials.50 Hence, the
proper interpretation of article 3, in view of the above, as well as of article
XVI of the General Treaty favoring construction firms is, first, that construction activities may qualify for national incentives because they fall within the
category of service industries or activities but, second, that only low-cost housing may enjoy custom exemptions for construction materials if so authorized
by national fiscal incentives and provided adequate regional substitutes are
unavailable.
Article 2 limits the Agreement's benefits to manufacturing industries that
contribute effectively to the economic development of Central America.
Article 4 elaborates these prerequisites in the following manner:51
Eligible for benefits of the regime of fiscal incentives established in
this Agreement are those enterprises whose industrial plants, utilizing
modern and efficient processes of fabrication in the transformation of
raw materials and semimanufactured products, produce articles which
are necessary for the development of other productive activities, or
to satisfy basic needs of the population, or to replace articles that are
being imported in considerable quantities, or to increase the volume
of exports.
In evaluating the contribution of these plants to economic development, account will also be taken of whether the value added in the industrial process is important in absolute or relative terms; whether
they contribute to a greater utilization of national or regional raw
materials or semimanufactured products; and whether, in general, they
increase the use of the natural, human, and capital resources of Central
America.

50.
51.

First Transitional article of the Agreement, INSUMENTS 130.
INSTRUMENTS 119.
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Article 4's variety of requirements and multiplicity of objectives may
prove only a minor obstacle to eligibility. In its 1964 discussion of the Article,
the Executive Council agreed that only two criteria were essential: first,
"transformation" by modem and efficient process of production of products
that meet one of the alternative requisites enumerated in the first paragraph
of article 4; second, added value in the industrial process -an objective
named in the second paragraph of article 4.52 Draft Regulation 8 further
clarifies these two minimal requisites.53 A process of modern and efficient
production means the employment of equipment and work methods that
improve industrial productivity in view of conditions prevailing in Central
America, which are and for a time may continue to be quite simple, if not
primitive. Second, the Regulation postulates that added value - that is, wages,
salaries, interest, rent, and profits"4 - is "important," as required by the second
paragraph of article 4, when it amounts to no less than twenty per cent of
the product's total value. As newly established industries in the Market average
from thirty-five to forty per cent added value,5 5 or double the Regulation's
minimum, the added value requisite should not appear as a serious obstacle
to eligibility.
On the other hand, the second paragraph of article 4 enumerates cumulative criteria. Therefore, the Council could condition eligibility on the utilization of a determined percentage of regional capital, inputs, and managerial
personnel, as well as increase the required percentage of added value. If the
CACM succeeds in attracting investment to such an extent as to render the
Agreement's incentives too generous, the Council could restrict them without
a formal revision of the Agreement by constructing article 4 into a more
formidable hurdle.
Classification
The Agreement divides enterprises that prove elegibile for incentives into
three Groups - A, B, C - and Groups A and B into new or existing industries,
with benefits varying with each classification.56 Group A comprises two
classes: the first includes industries that produce either industrial raw materials or capital goods; the second class encompasses enterprises that produce
articles of consumption, containers, or semimanufactured goods, provided
that at least fifty per cent of the total value of the raw materials, containers,
or semifinished products used are of Central American origin.57 To assure
52. 8 ACrA 7.
53. Id., Annex at 4.
54. Regulation 3 defines added value in the industrial process. Id. at 2.
55. R. HANSEN, CENTRAL AaEmRcA: REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
48 (1967).
56. Article 5 of the Agreement defines groups A, B, and C, while article 7 deals with
new industries. INSTRUMENTS 119-121. The national legislation of all five members differentiates between incentives to new and established industries. Additionally, El Salvador distinguishes between necessary and useful industries, while Honduras and Nicaragua divide
enterprises into basic, necessary, and useful categories. J. PiNcus, supra note 1, at 21.
57. Regulation 12 (a) stipulates that in evaluating the 50% regional value, imports value
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uniformity of decision regarding industrial raw materials and capital goods,
annex 2 to the Agreement defines these terms, 58 and article 5 requires the
Executive Council to adopt within thirty days from the effective date of the
Agreement, a list of industrial raw materials and capital goods based on their
annex 2 definitions. The list could be enlarged by the Council upon request,
provided the addition conforms to the definitions in the Annex and takes into
account the Secretariat's opinion. 59 The Annex further stipulates that regional industrial raw materials should contain a "high" proportion of added
value, calculated in a Regulation as amounting to forty-five per cent of total
value.60
Group B includes enterprises that produce consumer goods, containers, or
semimanufactured products with less than fifty per cent in value of Central
American inputs and hence not in Group A, provided that they contribute
"important" net benefits to the balance of payments and a "high" added
value in the industrial process. Regulation 13 calculates the high value as
no less than forty-five per cent of total value and injects important new benefits when the foreign exchange spent does not exceed seventy per cent of the
f.o.b. value of exports, or, when the product is an import substitution, it
saves at least twenty per cent in foreign currency. Group B industries could
still fall within Group A if by employing efficient industrial processes they
use manpower whose cost represents a high proportion - by Regulation at
least twenty per cent-of the total cost of production. 1 This incentive aims
at promoting the use of labor, thus reducing unemployment, but without
sacrificing the efficient process of production required by article 4.
The Agreement further divides Groups A and B into new and existing
industries. New industries, according to article 7, are those manufacturing
62
articles that:
(a) Are not produced in the country; or
(b) Are produced in the country by rudimentary methods of manufacture, provided that the new plant satisfies the two following conditions: (i) It fills an important part of the unsatisfied demand in the
market of the country; and (ii) It introduces radically different technical processes of manufacture which change the existing structure of
the industry and lead to an improvement in productivity and a reduction in cost.
Regulation 16 defines rudimentary methods of production as those that
do not meet article 4's criteria of modern and efficient processes of fabrication. 63 Since article 4 's efficiency is relative to the existing pattern of producshould be based on cost, insurance, and freight cost. 8 ACTA, Annex at 5-6. Thus, the calculation omits custom duties and charges on imports, thereby reducing the required amount
of regional value.
58. INSTRUMENTS 134-35.
59. Regulation 11, 8 CARTA, Annex at 5.
60. Regulation 13 (b), id. at 6.
61. Article 6, INSTRUMENTS 120; Regulation 15, 8 CARTA, Annex at 7.
62. INSTRUMENTS 120.
63. 8 CARTA, Annex at 7.
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tion in the Market and therefore easy to satisfy, 64 industries seeking a "new"
status pursuant to article 7 (b) may find it correspondingly difficult to prove
that the existing process of production is rudimentary, especially if the
enterprise employing them enjoys the Agreement's, or even national, fiscal
incentives. The Regulation further makes it hard to meet the requirements
of article 7 (b) (i) by finding unsatisfied demand to exist when the rudimentary production is less than ten per cent of consumption and by stipulating
that the installed capacity of the new industry must meet thirty per cent of
such shortage.
Additionally, the Article requires that before an enterprise is classified
as new, on the basis of section (b), a favorable technical opinion of the
Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty must be forthcoming. Still, the
determination of new industry status on a country basis may well lead to
similar investments in each member, causing duplication and waste. The
Agreement recognizes this danger and provides that classification of industries
will be made on an entirely Central American basis not later than the end
of the seventh year that the Agreement is in force.65 Hence, by that time, if
not earlier by a decision of the Economic Council,6 6 the words "Central

America" should replace the term "country" in both sections (a) and (b) of
article 7.
The least amount of benefits - a mere three-year exemption from custom
duties and related charges on the importation of machinery and equipment67
- is given Group. C, businesses. Group C comprises, according to article 5,
those enterprises that:68
(a) Do not satisfy the requirements indicated for Groups A and
B; or
(b) Simply assemble, pack, cut up or dilute; or
(c) Belong to the industries expressly enumerated in Annex 1 to
this Agreement.
Annex 1 mentions clothing, leather shoes, manufactured tobacco, perfumes,
and cosmetics or toilet preparations except soaps and dentifrices.9 These annex 1 products are either luxuries or adequately produced by each member,
and further incentives are, apparently, neither necessary nor desirable. On the
other hand, assembly industries may well manufacture raw material or capital
goods, utilize a high proportion of regional inputs or give rise to important
net benefits in the balance of payments and to a high proportion of added
value and should, therefore, be encouraged by more incentives than Group C
benefits. Hence, the Seventh Transitional provides that, within a year from
the effective date of the Agreement, members sign a protocol specifying the

64. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
65. Article 24, INsmumvUmrs 125.
66. Regulation 29, 8 AcrA, Annex at 13-14.
67. Article 15, INsmusEmms 123.

68. Id. at 120.
69.

INs'MUMENTS 133-34.
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regime of fiscal incentives that should apply to assembly activities, with article
5 (b) governing until such a protocol becomes effective.70
Neither the Agreement nor its Regulations, however, distinguish between
those manufacturing industries that produce and those that merely assemble,
pack, cut up, or dilute products. The language of article 5 (b) of the Agreement is similar to that of article V of the General Treaty postulating that the
Council shall not consider as originating in the Market products coming
from outside the region and merely assembled, packed, bottled, cut up, or
diluted in a member's territory. The Council applied article V to products
that were both diluted and bottled by a member, despite the conjunction
"or" in its language, 71 and this interpretation could well apply to article
5 (b) of the Agreement. Beyond this point, however, the Council's jurisprudence on article V is meager. 72 The Council refused to adopt a minimal added
value criteria or a transformation test - whether materials already manufactured change into a finished product for different use - suggested by the
73
Secretariat to determine origin, preferring instead a case-by-case approach.
Yet the Council's decisions denying origin were based on article III of the
Treaty, conspicuously lacking in any reference to article V, and taken despite
the Secretariat opinions that the products were immune from article V because
of added value, transformation process, or both.7 4 The Council, in effect,
denied the benefits of free trade not because the products were merely assembled, packed, cut up, or diluted, but because of their competitive edge
over substitutes utilizing a greater proportion of regional inputs. Thus, the
Council denied free trade to regional ballpoint pens that gained competitive
advantage by importing metal points from the United States, even though
these components amounted to only twelve per cent of total value and despite the Secretariat position that the pen qualified as a Central American
product based upon both the value added and the method of production.7 5
Hence, products denied free trade because of their nonorigin, as determined
under article III, may well qualify for fiscal incentives reserved for Groups
A or B, and articles enjoying Group A or B benefits may not necessarily be
eligible for free trade as, for example, ballpoint pens that import their points
from outside that area.
Benefits
The Agreement limits its benefits to custom and tax exemption. 76 Authorized tax incentives include the exemption of the enterprise and its owners from
70. Id. at 132. See also ECLA-SIECA, Central America: Industrial Policy Problems,
9 EcoN. BULL. LATIN AMERICA 118, 127-30 (1964) (outlines of protocol on fiscal incentives
to assembly industries).
71.

Resolution 18, 4 AcTA 16 (1963); SIECA Doc. CE-II/D.T.7 (1962) (SIECA's report).

72. See generally text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
73.

SIECA Doc. CE-SIS/94 (1965).

74. See note 42 supra.
75.

Resolution 78, 26

ACTA

20-21 (1967); SIECA Doc. CE-SSIV/D.T. 17 (1966) (SIECA's

report).
76. Article 8, INSTRUMENTS 121.
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income and profit taxes on revenue derived from qualified activities. These
concessions would not be granted, however, when the beneficiaries are subject to taxes in other countries, which would make the exemptions ineffective 77 The enterprise, its owners, or stockholders may also enjoy exemptiom
from taxes on assets and on the net worth of qualified activities. The Government of Honduras may, in addition, grant the free use of industrial buildings
for ten years or their sale at fifty per cent of value7 s On the other hand, the
Agreement neither prohibits nor regulates exemptions from municipal and
79
local taxes, but leaves them to national legislation.
Custom concessions may be extended to machinery and equipment, raw
materials, semifinished goods and containers, and fuels, with the exception
of gasoline, used "strictly" for industrial processes.8 0 The fuel exemption can
be granted neither for transport operations nor for the generation of power
if public service plants provide an adequate supply. All custom exemptions are
subject to two overriding requirements: first, the imports must be "indispensable" to the establishment or operation of the enterprise and, second, no
adequate Central Americal substitutes can be available.8' Even reimbursement
of import charges upon exportation to countries outside the CACM is conditioned upon the nonavailability of regional or national production 2 and,
as noted earlier, state purchases must prefer Central American products, if
adequate.8 3 Additionally, article 14 of the Protocol regulates the procedure
for solving disputes concerning the adequacy of regional substitutes.8 4 Even
though a member may consider them inadequate, it may not grant exemptions until "inadequacy" has been proved by a Secretariat opinion, rendered
within thirty days. Any interested party who disagrees with the opinion, must
notify the Secretariat within fifteen days so that the matter my be submitted
to the next meeting of the Executive Council. If the latter does not issue a
decision within ninety days, the question is thereby decided in accordance
with the opinion rendered by the Secretariat. Nonetheless, during all this
time exemptions may be granted subject .to a bond for the amount of the
concessions. Article 14 does not distinguish between the source of the exemptions and hence should apply to all, whether arising in connection with the
equalized incentives, government purchases, or even as a result of the activities
that the Agreement leaves to national legislation.85
77. For possible United States taxation of corporation and individuals that may Tender
the Agreement's tax exemptions ineffective, see, e.g., Hellawell, United States Income Taxation and Less Developed Countries: A Critical Appraisal, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1393 (1966);
Sloan, Taxation of American Controlled Foreign Earnings Under the Internal Revenue Act
Amendments of 1962, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 308 (1963); Comment, Qualified Investments in
Less Developed Countries Under the Revenue Act of 1962, 18 U. MiAmi L. Rxv. 675 (1964).
78. Article 9 of the Protocol, INSTRUMENTS 138.

79. Id. art. 3,at 118.
80. Note 76 supra.
81. Id.
82. Article 10, INSTRUMENTS 121-22; Regulation 26, 8 ACrA, Annex at 12.
83. Note 32 supra.
84. INSTRUMENTS 139.
85. Text accompanying note 48 supra (activities left to national incentives).
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The amount of benefits that may be granted depends to some extent
on the industry's location. The Agreement recognizes the relative backwardness of Honduras and Nicaragua and the need to hasten their industrial development. Hence, the Fifth Transitional provides that Group A and B industries in Honduras shall enjoy an additional two-year exemption from all
taxes and those in Nicaragua a one-year additional exemption.8 6 The Protocol granting preferential treatment to Honduras supersedes the Fifth Provisional as to that country, but leaves it intact for Nicaragua. s While increasing the Agreement's benefits for Honduras, the Protocol also decreased
the amount of custom exemptions that the Agreement had allowed to other
members. 8s Thus, benefits granted by the Agreement, as amended by the
Protocol, are the following:8 9
Group A, New Industries
1. Custom Exemptions. (i) Ten-year exemptions for the importation
of machinery and equipment; twelve years for Honduras. (ii) Exemptions
on imports of raw materials, semimanufactured goods and containers,
amounting to eighty per cent for the first five years, and fifty per cent
during the following five years. The Honduran preferences are more complicated. They range from a maximum of one hundred per cent for the
first five years and seventy per cent for the following five years to enterprises established during the first year the Protocol is in effect, to a minimum of one hundred per cent for the first five years, seventy per cent for
the following year, and fifty per cent for the subsequent four years to
plants installed during the fifth year of the Protocol. 90 (iii) A five-year
exemption on the importation of fuels.
2. Tax Exemptions. (i) Exemptions from income and profit taxes for
eight years, nine for Nicaragua, ten for Honduras. (ii) Exemptions from
taxes on assets and on net worth for ten years, eleven for Nicaragua, and
twelve for Honduras.
3. Industrial Buildings. For Honduras only, and includes the free use
of buildings for ten years or their sale at half value.
Group A, Existing Industries
1. Custom Exemptions. Limited to a six-year exemption for equipment
and machinery, eight years for Honduras.
2. Tax Exemptions. (i) Two-year exemption from income and profit
taxes, four years for Honduras. (ii) Four-year exemption from taxes on
assets and net worth, six for Honduras.
To encourage industries producing capital goods or industrial raw materials to use regional raw materials, article 16 provides that if the latter
INSTRUMENTS 131-32.
87. Id. art. 17, at 140.
88. Id. arts. 11, 12, at 138.
89. The summary of incentives is based on article 11 of the Agreement as amended by
article 11 of the Protocol, article 12 of the Agreement, article 13 of the agreement as
amended by article 12 of the Protocol, articles 14, 15 and the Fifth Transitional of the
Agreement, and articles 3-7, 9, and 17 of the Protocol. See also BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL,

86.

42 (1964) (comparison between the regional incentives
prior to their amendment by the Protocol and national concessions).
90. See appendix I of the Protocol, INSTRUMENTS 142 (comparison of exemptions to
Honduras with those of the Agreement as amended).
LATIN AMERICA'S MERCING MARKET
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represents at least half of the total value of the raw materials, the enterprise will receive an additional two-year exemption from taxes on income,
profits, assets, and net worth even if belonging to an existing industry.
Group B, New Industries.
1. Custom Exemptions. (i) Eight years for machinery and equipment,
ten years for Honduras. (ii) Exemptions for raw materials, semimanufactured goods and containers, amounting to eighty per cent for the first
three years and fifty per cent for the next two. In case of Honduras, they
range from a maximum of one hundred per cent for the first three years
and seventy per cent for the next two, to a minimum of one hundred per
cent for the first year, 'eighty per cent for the next two years, and fifty
per cent for the last two, depending on the year that the plant was
installed.91 (iii) Exemptions for fuels, one hundred per cent for the first
three years and fifty per cent for the next two. "
2. Tax Exemptions. A six-year exemption from taxes on income, profits,
net worth, and assets; seven years for Nicaragua and eight for Honduras.
3. Industrial Buildings. For Honduras only, ten-year rent free or sale
at half value.
Group B, Existing Industries.
A five-year exemption from duties on machinery and equipment, six
years for Honduras. Additionally, Honduras may also grant a two-year
exemption from income and profit taxes and a three-year exemption from
taxes on assets and net worth.
Group C.
A three-year custom free importation of machinery and equipment,
five years for Honduras. The latter may also grant a two-year exemption
from taxes on income, profit, assets, and net worth.
Thus, custom exemptions for raw materials, semifinished goods, containers,
and fuel are limited to Group A and to new industries in Group B. And,
excepting Honduras, only these groups also enjoy tax benefits.
Different benefits apply to reinvestment as opposed to expansion of
industrial plants. An enterprise classified in accordance with the Agreement
may, during the time the Agreement is in force, deduct from profits subject
to taxation the amount reinvested in machinery and equipment in order to
increase the productivity or the productive capacity of the enterprise or of any
of its branches located in the Market. 92 The amount reinvested each year
can be deducted only from the profits obtained during the same year from
qualified activities. In the case of Honduras, any enterprise, not only a classified one, may enjoy the reinvestment deduction, which in addition to machinery and equipment also includes reinvestment in industrial buildings.93
Enterprises investing in the expansion of their industrial plants receive, on
the other hand, custom exemptions on the importation of machinery and
equipment as well as exemption from taxes on assets and net worth for the
91. Id. app. 2 of the Protocol (comparison between Honduras and other members).
92. Id. art. 9, at 121.
93. Id. art. 10 of the Protocol at 138.
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amounts and periods corresponding to the classifications applicable to them,
but the tax exemption applies only to the additional investment. 94 Since
expansion entails greater benefits than reinvestment, their differentiation
becomes important. Hence, Article 2 of the Protocol to the Agreement, supplemented by regulation 5, defines expansion as the increase in machinery
or equipment, or both, that expands the installed productive capacity by at
least twenty-five per cent. 95 Alternatively, the machinery or equipment increase may incorporate new developments in the industrial process or modernize existing facilities, but in both cases the investment should be no less than
twenty-five per cent of the plant's capitalyo
Benefits by Extension

The Agreement supplements its scheme of graduated incentives, aimed at
channeling investment into determined priorities, with provisions that extend benefits to industries that would otherwise not enjoy them. The extension comprises the grant of new industry concessions to an existing one, the
restoration of a balance of competition through custom exemptions, and the
preservation, as well as expansion, of national fiscal incentives.
New Industries. Regulation 17 provides that if an enterprise is classified
as "new," a later one, though only "existing," would nonetheless receive "new"
industry benefits as long as the first enjoys them. 97 Thereafter, the second
enterprise would receive those concessions, if any, necessary to complete the
period of incentives allowed to an "existing" industry. The Regulation would
serve a useful purpose when the "new" industry classification, according to
article 24, applies regionally, that is, dependent on whether the products are
produced in the Market or produced by rudimentary means that fulfill only
ten per cent of regional demand. 8 By conferring a "new" status on later
industries, the Regulation should attract further investment and thus promote competition and overcome possible market dominance by the first venture. On the other hand, as long as the "new" industry determination is,
pursuant to article 7, on a country basis,9 9 the Regulation, if applicable,
would allow each member to have a number of similar activities enjoying
"new" fiscal incentives and thus would only compound the multiplicity of investment and waste already possible with each of the members assured of
the same "new" industry. Furthermore, if each member qualifies for the
same "new" industry, adequate, if not excessive, competition may well ensue,
thus rendering regulation 17 unnecessary until a regional determination of
newness is forthcoming. Finally, the second paragraph of regulation 17

94.

Id. arts. 20 of the Agreement, 2, 8 of the Protocol at 124, 135, 138.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 135; 8 AcrA, Annex at 3.
Note 95 supra.
8 AcrA, Annex at 8.
See notes 62-66 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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amounts to a de facto revision of article and should apply only when the
"existing" classification is on a regional rather than country basis., . :
Balance of Competition.Article 26 of the Agreement, as modified by article
13 of the Protocol, aims at equalizing competition by providing that: 100
Whenever one enterprise believes that the competitive ratio it had
been enjoying with another enterprise has been broken, in any Central
American country, in respect of exemptions or reduction in taxes on
the importation of raw materials, semimanufactured products, and
containers, by reason of the exemptions granted to this other enterprise,
the former may request the competent authorities of its country to
grant exemptions on raw materials, semimanufactured products and
containers to the extent that may be necessary to reestablish the competitive ratio.
To assure compliance with the prerequisites of this article, a member
must submit the case for the Secretariat's consideration and decision. 1 ' The
latter must then convoke the Executive Council, and if it does not decide
within ninety days the Secretariat's opinion stands.10 2 Nevertheless, this precaution may prove ineffective in preventing a proliferation of unnecessary
exemptions. The competitive ratio existing between two enterprises may
change when the period of custom exemptions ends for one but continues for
the other. Hence, it may well happen that because of such a time lag, the
offending enterprise only decreased a competitive ratio prejudicial to him,
but did not necessarily eliminate the competitive edge of the complainant.
Or, the preferential .treatment to Honduras may indeed enable an industry
there to restore a deteriorating imbalance without, however, gaining any competitive superiority. Yet, custom exemptions may extend to enterprises that
still enjoy a competitive advantage or that would continue to do so even
without the additional custom exemptions. Indeed, such an unnecessary waste
seems ordained by the last paragraph of article 26, as amended, that the
provisions of the article shall also apply to situations arising as a consequence
of the preferential treatment granted to Honduras. Not required to assure
adequate competition and only inducive to loss of revenue, the extension of
custom exemptions could and should be limited by a restrictive interpretation of article 26, as amended. Thus, article 13 of the Protocol should apply
only if, because of custom exemptions, the competitive ratio of the complainant falls below that of the offending enterprise. The article should not
apply as long as the former enjoys a competitive superiority or equality with
the latter. The harmful effect of the article could be further limited by the
requirement of proof and a Secretariat decision that the exemptions were the
sole cause for the deterioration in the competitive ratio. Such a procedure
may well be inherent in the last sentence of the first paragraph of the article,
INSUM=ENTS 138-59.
101. Id. at 139.
102. Id. The article allows exemption from custom duties pending a council's decision
provided a bond is posted for the amount of the exempted duties.

100.
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that the exemptions be limited to those necessary to the reestablishment of
0
the competitive ratio.1 3
National Fiscal Incentives. The Agreement devotes four transitional
provisions to the harmonization of its fiscal incentives with national benefits
granted before the Agreement became effective. 0 The First Transitional
denies any legal effect to national concessions granted to manufacturing industries that failed to utilize any of the exemptions within a period of one
year from the date of the decree, or of six months from the date the Agreement becomes effective, whichever is longer. The enterprise thus shorn of its
national privileges would have to apply for the Agreement's classification
and benefits. On the other hand, the First Transitional allows industries
enjoying national incentives within the permissible time limit to continue such
concessions, provided that custom exemptions for the importation of construction materials cease and all other exemptions are subject to article IX of
the General Treaty. 0 5 Finally, the First Transitional allows enterprises subject to national fiscal incentives to receive benefits equal to the greatest that
are being enjoyed by other enterprises producing similar articles pursuant to
national concession of any member, but only for the duration of the latter.
Thus, the First Transitional equalizes national incentives by allowing the
greatest concession to govern.
Enterprises that continue to be subject to national fiscal incentives may,
according to the Second Transitional, opt within six months for reclassification under the Agreement. If reclassified, the period of benefits that elapsed
under national law is deducted from that allowed by the Agreement. Enterprises may thus choose between the more advantageous of the two systems and
in view of the limited benefits probably will not reclassify themselves if they
fall into Group C. 106 Yet, fiscal incentives to that group, according to the
Agreement's scheme of benefits, are the most wasteful and unnecessary to
regional development. Hence, the Third Transitional stipulates that industries included within national legislation and classifiable in Group C pursuant to the Agreement and exporting their products to any member, will be
guilty of receiving export subsidies in violation of article XI of the General
Treaty, if not reclassified. Thus, the Third Provisional revises article XI of
the General Treaty to include, within a prohibited export subsidy, fiscal incentives enjoyed by industries that would belong to Group C if reclassified
under the Agreement.
As a further incentive to reclassification, as well as protection to industries

103. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
104.

INSTRUMENTS

13-32.

105. See text accompanying note 32 supra. The Economic Council, in resolution No.
57 of May 15, 1969, resolved that the requests for industrial classification or reclassification
presented to, but not decided upon by, the administrative authorities at the moment the
Agreement entered into force, would be processed, and decided upon in accordance with
the Agreement. 92 CARTA 1 (1969) (text).
106. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
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established after the Agreement became effective, and hence classifiable
thereunder, the Fourth Transitional provides:107
The governments may extend to the enterprises which are classifiable in accordance with this Agreement benefits equal to the greatest
that were being enjoyed, in their country or in any other Central American country, by enterpiises producing the same articles by virtue of
national concessions, during the time these concessions are in effect.
When these concessions terminate, the enterprises will receive the
benefits envisaged in this Agreement for the time elapsing before the
completion of the corresponding period.
The Fourth Transitional would extend, even to Group C industries,
national incentives enjoyed by similar enterprises not classified pursuant to
the Agreement. Such an extension of benefits would not amount to export
subsidies since the structure of the Third Transitional applies only to national
industries resisting reclassification. As a result, Group C, which least deserves
benefits, may enjoy national benefits and immunity from a prohibited export
subsidy while similar activities subject to the same incentives could not freely
export their products within the CACM. Aiming only at the equalization of
national and regional benefits, the Fourth Transitional, unwittingly perhaps,
discriminates between industries enjoying the same concessions. To obviate
this discrimination, the Executive Council could resort to article XIII of
the General Treaty, which enables a member who "considers that unfair
business practices exist not included in Article XI . . . [to] submit the
problem for consideration by the Executive Council in order that the latter
may report whether such practices are in fact occurring, 108 and hold that
the combination of national incentives and immunity from article XI in
Group C amounts to an unfair trade practice. This may persuade some
Group C enterprises to decline the equalization of incentives pursuant to
the Fourth Transitional and prefer instead the benefits of free trade. Thus,
the application of article XIII of the General Treaty to the Fourth Transitional in the context of Group C would not only obviate the discriminatory
effect of that Transitional, but would also tend to reduce the latter's duplication and waste where it is least deserved or needed.
No transitional provision, however, deals with post-Agreement reinvestment and expansion by pre-Agreement enterprises that elect to continue their
national incentives as permitted by the First Transitional. Reinvestment and
expansion may continue long after the main period of concessions ceased, and
if the First Transitional is interpreted to apply to reinvestment and expansion,
the most favorable national treatment may be granted to all other enterprises producing similar articles, whether classified under national law or
the Agreement, pursuant to the stipulations of the First and Fourth Transitionals. This would result in national supremacy and waste of resources long
after the Agreement should have replaced national incentives, which, instead,

107. INSTRUMENTS 131.
108. Id. at 28.
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would last as long as a pre-Agreement enterprise not reclassified under the
Agreement continued to expand or reinvest. If such a chain reaction of
national benefits expansion is to be avoided reinvestment and expansion
should be subject to articles 9 and 20 of the Agreement once the period of
national concessions given to the establishment of the enterprise ended. 10 9
Indeed, article 20, governing expansion, applies to "qualifiable enterprises,"
a phrase comprising not only those classified pursuant to the Agreement, but
also activities not so classified, provided they meet the criteria of article 4.110
Article 9, on the other hand, grants reinvestment benefits only to enterprises
"classified in accordance with this Agreement." This may mean that those
opting to remain under national legislation pursuant to the First Transitional
could not receive reinvestment benefits under article 9 and would be deprived
of any incentive to reinvestment. Since benefits for reinvestment are minimal
and less than for expansion, there seems to be no reason to limit them to a
group smaller than the one entitled to the more generous incentives for expansion. Thus, article 9 should be rendered more consistent with article 20's
"qualifiable enterprises." This approximation would obtain if the term
"classified in accordance with the Agreement" also included enterprises classified under national law pursuant to the First Transitional, which is surely
part of the Agreement. Under no circumstances, however, should reinvestment be taken out of article 9, whatever its interpretation, and relegated to
the First Transitional.
Conclusion

The Agreement harmonizes national and regional incentives by substituting the former for the latter, and equalizes competition by assuring that
the most extensive concession applies. Necessary perhaps to achieve the unanimity of ratification, and though limited in time, the extension of benefits
should be further limited by the above possible interpretations to avoid
unnecessary, protracted, and costly waste of resources.
Supervision

The Agreement provides for multilateral supervision to assure the proper
application of the uniform incentives. Although the initial responsibility for
administering the Agreement is left to national Administrative Authorities,
defined as the Ministry that is responsible in each member for the administration of the Agreement,' the Executive Council is to study and resolve any
problem or conflict among the contracting parties.112 The Agreement aims,

however, not only at the solution of disputes, but also at their prevention by
such means as clarification by regulations, publicity, and technical opinions.

109.
110.
111.
112.

See text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.
See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra.
Regulation 2(d), 8 AcTA, Annex at 1.
Article 23 of the Agreement, INSTRUMIFNTS 124.
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The Regulations. Article 47 of the Agreement charges the Executive Council with drafting and the parties with the adoption of uniform regulations to
the Agreement. The Regulations aim at quantifying and defining various
terms used in the Agreement and at specifying the procedure that should
govern the application for, and the grant of, fiscal incentives. 1 3 Although
apparently requiring the approval of the Economic Council,"x4 the Regulations may prove easier to revise than the formal process of the Agreement's
amendment and its unanimity of ratification. The more successful the CACM
proves in attracting investment because of factors other than fiscal incentives,
the greater may be the need for their revision. Hence, the Regulations not
only contribute to uniformity and render the Agreement easier to apply,
serving to eliminate doubts, disputes, and frictions, but they may also prove
a prime tool for conforming fiscal benefits to the changing realities of the
Common Market.
Publicity. Publicity regarding the application of the Agreement by the
parties, tends to assure that they abide by their commitments and correct any
default, thus reducing both infractions and controversies. Hence, the Agreement aims at the dissemination of full and accurate information about its
administration and, to that end, specifies the information that a request for
fiscal incentives should contain, as well as the details of a technical study
that should accompany the application."15 The summary of the application
must be published in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of large circulation, and the Agreement further specifies the information to be contained
in the decree granting the benefits and provides for its publication.116 The
same procedures extend to transfer of benefits, solicitation for custom exemptions under article 26, and to requests for most favorable national incentives
pursuant to the First and Fourth Transitionals."-r
As a second means to gain information and assure its dissemination, the
Agreement requires the submission of certain reports and documents by one
Administrative Authority to the others or to the Secretariat. These comprise
a summary of requests for benefits, their grant or rejection, and a yearly list
of enterprises that would be exempt from taxes.""" Additionally, members
must notify the Secretariat of any decision not to cancel a concession to an
enterprise in which production started later than two years from the effective
date of the decree of classification," 9 and provide the Secretariat with an

113.
114.
115.
8 AcrA
116.
117.
118.
119.

See text and note 47 supra.
Letter, note 47 supra.
Articles 29-30 of the Agreement, INSTRUMENTS 126-27; Annex 1 to the Regulations,
(forms).
Articles 31, 33-34, INSraUIsNTS 127-28.
Id. art. 36, at 128; Regulations 25, 47-50, 8 AcrA, Annex at 11-12, 24-27.
Article 35, INSausENirs 128; Regulations 32, 40, 46, 8 ACTA, Annex at 15-16, 21, 24.
Regulation 42, 8 AcrA, Annex at 22. Article 34(d) of the Agreement stipulates that

the period for the beginning of production shall not exceed two years from the effective
date of the decree of classification, but the period may be extended in exceptional cir-

cumstances up to three years.

INSMUMENTS

128. The decree becomes effective when accepted
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annual report of a general nature on the application of the Agreement. 120 The
Secretariat, in turn, issues monthly reports on the Agreement's administration
by the members.

121

Technical Opinions. Impartial opinions on whether application for benefits meet the technical requisites of the Agreement assure its uniformity of
application and tend to minimize controversies. If rendered by regional organs,
these technical pronouncements also would fully take into account regional,
rather than national, aims and policies. Hence, the Agreement stipulates
that Group B industries may qualify for Group A because of a high proportion of manpower"22 only upon obtaining a favorable technical opinion from
the Secretariat, based on studies requested from the Central American Institute of Industrial Research and Technology (ICAITI).1 23 Similarly, a favorable technical opinion of the Secretariat is necessary for the grant of new
industry status if similar products are already produced in the country."'
This prior opinion will be required for any new industry determination once
the latter is based on regional, rather than country-by-country, criteria. 1" 5
In order to restore a broken competitive ratio 1 2 6 the Administrative Authority
must submit for the Secretariat's consideration and decision any request for
custom exemptions, and in case of doubt about the adequacy of regional substitutes no exemptions from duties could be granted until the inadequacy of
regional substitutes is proved by a Secretariat's opinion prepared in collaboration with ICAITI. 12 Although not required by the Agreement, a Regulation
calls upon the Executive Council to take into account the Secretariat's opinion on the applicability of the definitions contained in annex 2 to the Agreement if a member suggests additions to the list of capital goods and industrial
raw materials. 128 On the other hand, neither the Agreement nor the Regulations deal with the Secretariat's participation in the technical and economic
study that must accompany a request for classification, 1 29 but national legislation may require the applicant to ask ISAITI to conduct such a study."30
Since required by the Agreement and the Protocol, the Secretariat's opinions remain authoritative unless overruled by the Executive Council. The
Protocol further stipulates for their validity if the Council does not reach a

in writing by the applicant and published in the official gazette or newspaper. Id. art. 33
of the Agreement at 127.
120. Article 35 INSTRUM NTS at 128.
121. Id.
122. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
123. Article 6, INSTRUMENTS 120. See also the 1955 Agreement on the Establishment of
the Central American Institute of Industrial Research and Technology, id. at 190.
124. Article 7, INSTRUMENTS 120.
125. Regulation 36, 8 ACrA, Annex at 17.
126. See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
130. J. Pimcus supra note 1,at 79 (Guatemala).
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decision within a specified time limit.331 Yet, article XXI of the General
Treaty specifies that in case the Executive Council fails to reach agreement
the matter "shall" be referred to the Economic Council, and the latter has
interpreted its powers to mean that members could always appeal from the
Executive Council's decisions." 32 The Regulations for the Solution of Controversies adopted by the Economic Council in March 1968 further provide
for the participation of individuals - both natural persons and legal entities who are parties to a dispute in the Executive Council's process of review.?33
Designated by the chief of the member's delegation, such persons may ex134
pound to the Council their views, and positions and answer any question.
Other persons having a direct interest in the matter and representatives of
private associations may be present at the Executive Council's sessions with
its permission.35 However, all are excluded from the Council's deliberation
on the merits of the case as well as from voting on its resolution.136 A similar
7
procedure applies to appeals from the Executive to the Economic Council.'3
The Process of National Decision. Since initial decision on requests for
the Agreement's incentives are left to the national Administrative Authorities, the Agreement regulates their procedure and provides for an appeal to
the Executive Council. Any natural or legal person, a term that may include
the Secretariat because it possesses the legal status of a corporate body, may
oppose, in accordance with the procedures established in the Regulation
and national law, applications to the Administrative Authority. 38 The Regulations establish no procedure, however, except to mention that third party
opposition should be presented within fifteen days from the last publication
of the request for benefits and that intervention should follow the applicable
procedure.139 The Regulations' silence on such a procedure leaves intact national law, which could include a provision for appealing the decision of
the Administrative Authority to a higher state organ.
The Administrative Authority may refuse to grant benefits to a proposed
investment and thereby lead to its location in the territory of a member
willing to confer them. Article 27 indicates that the refusal may be appealed
to the Executive Council, but with the risk that if the rejection is "confirmed"
no enterprise can, with respect to the same investment project, be qualified
or classified in any of the other members.140 The rejecting member himself
may want to ask for the Council's confirmation since, if forthcoming, it would

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
General
139.
140.

Articles 13-14, INSTRUMENTS 138-39.
See notes 23, 24 supra.
Text of the Regulations in 78 CARTA 9 (1968).
Articles 11, 35 of the Regulations.
Article 11 of the Regulations.
Article 36 of the Regulations.
Article 50 of the Regulations.
Article 31 of the Agreement, INSTRUMENTS 127. See also Article XXII of the
Treaty, id. at 31 (SIECA enjoys the legal status Qf the corporate body).
Regulation 33, 8 AcTA, Annex at 16.
INSTRUMENTs 125-26.
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preclude shopping for other sites, but if the refusal is not affirmed the member might reconsider its decision. On the other hand, the Agreement does not
indicate whether the rejecting member is bound to reevaluate or grant the
application if the Council decides that the rejection was erroneous or unjustified. Regulation 23, however, obligates the Administrative Authority
to comply with the Council's decisions dealing with any of the Agreement's
provisions;141 therefore, the Council should be able to remit the case for
further proceedings or even indicate the action that the national authority
should take. The combination of article 27 and regulation 23 thus provides
the Council with three alternative courses of action. First, the Council could
confirm the rejection, thereby precluding a similar investment from qualifying for benefits within CACM; second, the Council could remand the case
with any directions deemed appropriate or necessary to the rejecting authority; or, third, the Council could refrain from confirming the rejections,
thereby allowing the project to apply for reconsideration or to another
member. The choice between these alternatives should depend on the reasons
for the refusal of the application. The more these pertain to a discrimination
against other members' capital, goods, or nationals, or based on misinterpretation of the Agreement's provisions, the greater seems the need and the
justification for the Council to indicate to the Administrative Authority a
different course of action. On the other hand, the more the national rejection
contains an element of permissible discretion or technical imponderables as,
for example, an assessment of the financial soundness and reputation of the
promoters or a belief that the project would collapse with the termination
of the incentives, the more the Council should respect the Authority's reluctance, and limit its action to nonconfirmation, thereby allowing a reconsideration by the rejecting member, if willing, or the location of the investment somewhere else within CACM. Even though a project is eligible for
the Agreement's benefits, a member may also reject it on the ground that
the particular industry would only add to the multiplicity of investment and
waste of resources. If the contention proves accurate on a regional basis, not
only on a national level, the Council should indeed confirm the decision
since it coincides with the interest of all members and the reason for their
economic integration.
Article 28, in turn, specifies the procedure for appeals from a national
decision regarding classification. A member who believes that another classified an enterprise in a group different from the one the Agreement authorizes may submit the case to the Executive Council within three months from
the publication of the decree or order of classification. The Council, according to the article, will determine the correct classification and the national
administrative authority will have to modify its decree accordingly. A more
general prohibition against benefits differing from those of the Agreement
appears in article 3, which prohibits members from granting fiscal benefits of
a kind, amount, or duration different from those provided in the Agreement,
except for exemptions from municipal or local taxes. Neither article, however,
141.

8 ACrA, Annex at 10.
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sheds light on whether members may grant fewer benefits than the Agreement
or its Regulations authorize. The Agreement aims at uniformity of incentives to eliminate waste of resources inherent in the competition between
national incentives; yet this policy would prosper if members detract from
the concessions that the Agreement or its Regulations allow. On the other
hand, the graduation of benefits serves to attract capital into predetermined
priorities, and this function may be prejudiced if members are free to deny
stimulants granted by the Agreement or to impose stricter conditions than
those contained in the Regulations. Still, the Agreement advances in various
circumstances national, rather than regional, interests, primarily during the
transitional period,142 and a member should be free to forego concessions that
prejudice, rather than enhance, regional objectives. Similarly, a member enjoying a concentration of similar industries in its territory may add rather
than detract from the balanced economic development of the region as a
whole if it imposed on an incoming industry stricter conditions than authorized by the Agreement or the Regulations, thereby causing new ventures to
concentrate in the less industrialized members. Hence, the categorical prohibition against different benefits contained in articles 3 and 28 should be
limited to cases of excess concessions and by themselves not prohibit a detraction from incentives or conditions contained in the Agreement and its
Regulations. The Executive Council, charged by article 23 with the study
of any problem and the resolution of disputes arising from the Agreement's
application, should therefore allow the minimization of benefits contributing
to the balanced development of the area and neither prejudicing nor discriminating against other members.
Sanctions. As a final step in the process of multilateral supervision, the
Agreement enumerates various sanctions for its violation. Some of these pertain to actions by a member against the offending enterprise. Thus, according
to article 88, the improper use of products imported with custom exemptions
is punishable by a fine ranging from three to ten times the total amount not
paid or the cancellation of the concession, or both, without prejudice to other
legal provisions in force in each country. Additionally, the Administrative
Authority is empowered to cancel the incentives for any other nonfulfillment
of the obligations contained in the Agreement or the national decrees that
classified the offending enterprise. Other penalties comprise the measures that
members may take against each other. Thus, the Third Transitional includes
within article XI of the General Treaty exports of enterprises that refuse to
classify themselves within Group C. 14 3 Additionally, article 41 provides:41
It will be considered a practice of unfair competition to export to another Central American country any product whose cost has been reduced by virtue of improper use of the fiscal benefits granted or of an
order or decree of classification which is not adjusted to the terms of
142.
143.
144.

See text accompanying notes 97-108 supra.
See text accompanying note 106 supra.
INSTRUMENTS 129.
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this Agreement. Such practices will be subject to the procedures and
sanctions established in Chapter III of the General Treaty of Central
American Economic Integration.
Chapter III of the General Treaty relates to export subsidies and other
unfair trade practices and provides for both interim measures and final
sanctions.145 The chapter distinguishes between imports of products made
with raw materials acquired under monopoly conditions at artificially low
prices that might threaten the existing production in another signatory and
other unfair trade practices, such as export subsidies, dumping, interference
with the multilateral free trade system, or discriminatory restrictions on
monetary transfers. In the former case, the Council "shall" decide whether to
authorize a provisional guarantee limited to the amount of import duties
and must issue a final decision within thirty days. 1 46 If no authorization for
the guarantee is forthcoming within five days, the complaining member is
free to impose it pending a final decision. A different procedure applies to
other unfair trade practices. The member must ask the Council's permission
to levy import duties pending a final resolution. If no decision about the
authorization is reached within eight days, the member is free to impose it
47
pending a final decision, which should be forthcoming within sixty days.1
On the other hand, the Treaty does not specify the final measure available
to curb unfair practices, but merely provides that the Council shall inform
the members whether protective measures may be applied pursuant to the
Treaty.14 These could include custom duties as well as internal equalization
taxes.

49

If insufficient, the Council could resort to the measures specified in

the 1962 Protocol to the Agreement of the Equalization of Import Duties
against unfair practices from outside the region.'9 0 These comprise a fine of
one hundred dollars per gross kilo plus one hundred per cent ad valorem.
Article 41 considers as unfair competition the exportation of a product
whose cost has been reduced by improper use of fiscal benefits or noncompliance with the Council's directives. Yet, even if not exported, such price
reduction would adversely affect the competitive position of regional products
within the market of the offending member, thereby detracting from free
and fair regional trade and competition. The Agreement, however, lacks any
definite procedure for enforcing compliance with its provisions and the Council's decisions thereunder if the offending product is internally consumed.
Hence, the Council will have to fashion appropriate remedies and procedures,
which may be pursuant to article XlII of the General Treaty if the offense
is deemed an unfair trade practice. Alternatively, as the Agreement resulted
from the undertaking assumed in article XIX of the General Treaty, the
Council could develop further sanctions under article XXII, which authorizes
145.

Articles IX-XIV, INSTMUNENTs 26-28.

146. Article XI.
147. Article XIII.
148. Article XIV.
149. See article VI; text accompanying note 42 supra.
150. Text of the Protocol in 2 CONVENIOS 9.
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the Council to lay down the measures necessary to ensure the fulfillment of
the undertakings entered into pursuant to the Treaty.' 5'
Incentives and Articles not in Free Trade
The preceding discussion concerning fiscal incentives in general and
custom exemptions in particular made no distinction between regional products enjoying free trade and those that do not. 5 2 The 1968 Multilateral
Treaty of Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration, the forerunner of the 1960 General Treaty, specified that the prohibition on custom
exemptions and the equalization of benefits were limited to products in free
trade, but this limitation is absent from articles IX and XIX of the General
Treaty as well as from the Agreement and its Protocol. Hence, linguistically
at least, these instruments apply to all regional goods and further considerations render such an interpretation desirable. The equalization of fiscal incentives aims, in part, at the elimination of fiscal loss inherent in national
escalation of concessions because of competition for capital, and this policy
53
remains valid whether or not countries grant each other free trade benefits.
The prohibition on custom exemptions, if adequate regional products are
available, not only assures fair competition but, as indicated by article 42
of the Agreement relating to governmental purchases, also promotes the
utilization of regional items in preference to imports. 54 Such a preferential
policy encourages regional trade and further industrial development, and the
preference should therefore apply whether or not the regional products are in
free trade provided that they meet the adequacy requirement of articles IX
of the General Treaty and 14 of the Protocol to the Agreement on Fiscal
Incentives. r
The prohibition on custom exemptions if regional substitutes are adequate,
although not in free trade, may complicate the procedure for price comparison. To preserve the margin of preference granted to regional goods by
free trade, the Executive Council usually adds to the cost, insurance, and
freight (c.i.f.) price of the foreign product the import charges and duties
that it would have to pay without the exemptions.'5I Many of the restricted

151. The Executive Council resorted to article XXII in order to fill a gap left in the
text of article VI relating to international taxation of regional goods. Resolution 71, 25
AcrA 13 (1967); Ereli, The Central American Common Market: Integration in Practice, 43

TuLr L. Rv. 1, 16-17 (1968). See also text accompanying note 108 supra (article XIII of
the General Treaty).
152. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra (items out of free trade).
153. Indeed, the advantages of a general agreement between all developing countries
to eliminate excessive competition of fiscal incentives has been suggested. Meier, Legal-Economic Problems of Private Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 33 U. Cm. L. REv.

464, 480 (1960).
154. See note 32 supra.
155. See note 32 supra and accompanying text (article IX of the Treaty and article 42

of the Protocol); 84-85 (art. 14).
156. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
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products enjoy a preference vis-d-vis nonregional goods, 157 and if their price
including the preferential tariff is less than those imported, custom exemptions should be granted only to the regional products since the preferential
margin would otherwise prove illusory. On the other hand, the regional goods
may prove more costly than the foreign substitutes if the tariff each pays is
added, but cheaper if the duty is computed only for the latter. In such a
situation the Council could validly decide that the regional article is, pricewise, inadequate. Alternatively, the Council could stretch to the limit the
preference in favor of regional items and thus foster regional trade and
further industrialization by excluding from the price of regional goods the
custom duties and charges that they usually pay if in annex A. This interpretation of articles IX of the General Treaty and 14 of the Protocol would
thus allow custom exemptions to foreign goods only if the regional substitutes, whether or not in free trade, proved more costly without duties and
charges than the foreign product whose price would include, for comparative
purposes, import duties and charges.
OTHER INCENTIVES

Although the General Treaty and the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives are
the main instruments regulating fiscal incentives throughout the Common
Market, other agreements refer to such concessions.
The Central American IntegrationIndustries
The 1958 Multilateral Treaty liberalized trade only in a limited number
of products and contained only a promise to equalize duties.158 The 1958
Agreement on the Central American Integration Industries, on the other hand,
aimed at achieving a speedier liberalization and equalization by specific
protocols concerning particular industries requiring access to the whole
Market in order to operate economically even at a minimum capacity. 5 9
The Agreement, antedating that on Fiscal Incentives, contemplated "ample
fiscal incentives" and provided that integration plants enjoy the benefits and
exemptions prescribed by the national legislation of the member in whose
territory the plant would be located. 60 The First Protocol, signed in 1963,
postdated the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives and hence does not conform to
the benefits envisaged in the Agreement on Integration Industries. Granting
integration industry status to a tire and tube factory that already existed in
Guatemala and to those that would be producing caustic soda and insecticides in Nicaragua, the Protocol provides for a ten-year exemption from
duties and charges on imports of raw materials and intermediary products and
157. Annex A to the General Treaty contains a list of items not in free trade but
enjoying preferential treatment vis-dl-vis nonregional goods. 1 CoNVENTos 67.
158. 1 CONVENIOS 11 (list of products in free trade).
159. INSTRUMENTS 89 (text of Agreement). See also Ereli, supra note 151, at 24-31, and
sources cited at 25, note 118.
160. Article IV, INSTRUMENTS 91.
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from municipal taxes levied on the production or consumption of such products.161 All other tax benefits were to be governed by the Agreement on
Fiscal Incentives and depend on the classification of the particular industry
according to that Agreement. The Second 1965 Protocol, pertaining to a
plate glass plant in Honduras, follows the first one in regard to custom and
consumption tax exemptions but leaves other tax benefits to the Honduran
162
legislation.
The incorporation of the Honduran tax exemptions in the Second Protocol poses the question of whether they can be extended to nonintegration
enterprises pursuant to the most favored national incentives treatment of the
First and Fourth Transitionals of the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives. 163 The
Protocols' totality of benefits follows neither the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives nor national legislation, but a mixture of both..6 Hence, they can be
viewed as sui generis, or a third category of incentives and not within the
term "national concessions" that the Transitionals extend to classified enterprises. Furthermore, the Transitionals aim at equalizing incentives granted
by a unilateral decision based on national, rather than on regional, objectives.
On the other hand, the Protocols, requiring three ratifications, 5 constitute
a multilateral grant of concessions and reflect a regional policy that may be
subverted if the exemption encompassed nonintegration enterprises. Article
26, however, does not distinguish, in contradistinction to the Transitionals,
between national and uniform custom exemptions and applies to a competitive ratio broken even by regional custom concessions to raw materials, semifinished products and containers1 66 Hence, the Article would regulate competition between Integration and other enterprises.
The experience of the Guatemalan tire and tube plant indicates a problem that may recur in the context of other fiscal benefits. The need to diversify caused the integration plant to branch into the production of rubber heels
and overshoes, for which no custom exemptions were authorized.1 67 Some
members complained that the integration plant was utilizing the tire and
tube custom exemptions to subsidize the production of the other products.
The Secretariat's report indicated that this possibility existed, but could not
161. Id. at 94 (text).

162. Id. at 109 (text).
163. See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra (First Transitional), 107 supra (Fourth
Transitional).
164. The Protocol's custom exemptions, e.g., are broader than those of the Agreement
on Fiscal Incentives, equal to the Guatemalan concessions, but less than authorized by the
legislations of Honduras and Nicaragua. BUSINESS

INTERNATIONAL,

LATIN AMERICA's

EMERGING

MARI= 42 (1964) (comparison between national incentives and those of the Agreement
before its amendment by the Protocol). Furthermore, the Agreement does not include, as
do the Protocols, exemption from internal consumption taxes.
165. Articles 38 of the First Protocol and 23 of the Second, INSRUMENrS 108, 116. Additionally, article III of the Agreement requires the signature of all the members to any
protocol. Id. at 90.
166. See text accompanying notes 100-103 supra (text and discussion on article 26 and
its application to uniform incentives).
167. SIECA Doc. CE-XXX/D.T.3 Add. 1 (1967). Actual production of tires and tubes
amounted to only half of installed capacity. 22 ACrA 44 (1966).
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be conclusively proved or disproved without a further exhaustive study of
all relevant account books, especially in view of the company's bookkeeping
procedures.168 In view of the evidence indicating the possibility of unfair
trade practice the Council authorized members by a 3-2 vote to demand a
guarantee for custom duties pursuant to article XIII of the General Treaty. 16 9
Hence, any industry producing articles subject to differing concessions should
be ready to prove that the greater benefits are not diverted into products
enjoying no, or lesser, incentives.
Protocol to the General Treaty
A 1968 Protocol to the General Treaty aims at the defense of the region's
balance of payments through temporary emergency measures to protect and
improve the foreign exchange reserves of the area. 70 These include a fiveyear Economic Stabilization Tax (Tax), on third country products not listed
in annex A to the Protocol. The Tax amounts to thirty per cent of the
total amount of custom duties, and a member may increase the percentage
for items whose tariff is unequalized.' 7' Article VII of the Protocol applies the
Tax to enterprises enjoying custom exemptions pursuant to national legislation to promote industrial development or the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives and its Protocol. On the other hand, the Tax does not apply, according
to article IX of the Protocol, to third country products immune from custom
duties by virtue of contracts or concessions approved by the legislative branch
of the particular member. Hence, by virtue of both Articles, Integration Industries should be Tax exempt, since their custom exemptions are based
upon Protocols ratified by members and not the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives or national legislation to promote industrial development.' 72
Furthermore, article X of the Protocol authorizes the Executive Power of
each member to grant Tax exemptions for capital goods, raw materials,
semifinished products, containers, and fuels and lubricants (except gasoline)
destined exclusively for industrial processes. The Article applies to enterprises pertaining to new industries of particular importance for the economic
development of Central America and provided the exempted products are not
168.
169.

SIECA Doc. CE-XXX/D.T.3 Add. I, at 34-38. (1967).
82 CARTA 4 (1968). See also text accompanying notes 146-47 supra (provisional

measures under article XIII).
170. 81 CARTA 13 (1968) (text).
171. Id. arts. II-V, at 15. The list of exempted products appears at annex 1, id. at 21.
The Annex comprises Ill items such as food stuffs, chemicals, medicine, fertilizers, farm machinery, and transport. The Executive branch of each member may request the Economic
Council to enlarge the list, and the latter may delegate its authority to the Executive
Council. The request for modification must be based on a showing that the tax severely
affects the interest of the Central American consumer or the operation, under reasonable
conditions, of basic economic activities such as agriculture, livestock, and transport. Article
XII, id. at 17. Although the Protocol and its Annex require ratification in accordance with
constitutional or legal requirements, the Annex modification may proceed by executive
action.
172. See note 165 supra.
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produced there in adequate conditions of price, quantity, and quality.71 3 The
Article defines as "new industries of particular importance to the economic
development of Central America those that: (a) produce raw materials or
capital goods; or (b) produce containers or semifinished goods provided that
at least fifty percent of the total value of the raw materials, containers, or
semifinished products utilized are of Central American origin; or (c) give rise
to important net benefits in the balance of payments and to a high value
added in the industrial process."' 74
Part (c) of article X, in contradistinction to parts (a) and (b), omits the
requirement of production. Therefore, even assembly activities may qualify for
Tax exemptions in view of their contribution to the balance of payments.
On the other hand, the Article does not define "new" industries, and the
Protocol as a whole lacks any criteria for determining newness. This may
mean that "new" industries are those so classified either by national legislation or by the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives.175 Additionally, a Transitory
Article provides that to maintain the level of competition within the Market,
the first four members depositing their ratification may grant Tax exemptions,
but only to raw materials, intermediate goods, and containers when not produced in Central America, thus not even requiring adequate regional substitutes. Such exemptions are limited to enterprises enjoying custom exemptions pursuant to national legislation to promote industrial development or
the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives and its Protocol. This Tax concession
ceases automatically with the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification,
thus posing the question whether article 26 of the Agreement as amended by
its Protocol would apply thereafter76
Article 26, as amended, corrects a competitive ratio broken by "exemptions
or reduction in taxes on the importation of raw materials, semimanufactured
products and containers" by granting them to the complaining enterprise
to the extent necessary to reestablish the competitive ratio.Y77 The term "taxes"
in the Article could thus be interpreted to include the Tax. Additionally, if
Tax exemptions pursuant to article X of the Protocol affect the operation of
a nonexempted enterprise, the latter may seriously suffer because of the Tax
it has to pay, and thus qualify for article XI of the Protocol. This would allow
the Executive Power to exempt, with the Executive Council's permission based
on an opinion by the Secretariat, enterprises whose operations were seriously
affected by the application of the Tax. Article XI exemption would be
broader than article 26's, and would also extend to capital goods and fuels
and lubricants, except gasoline, destined for industrial development.27s
173. Article 14 of the Protocol to the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives requiring a
Secretariat-ICAITI opinion in case of disputes on the adequacy of regional substitutes
encompasses "exemptions for the importation of any article" INSTRUMENTs 139 (emphasis
added). This language could, and should, include tax exemptions.
174. 81 CARTA at 17.
175. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra (new industries).
176. See text accompanying notes 100-103 supra (art. 26).

177.

INSTRUMENTS

138-39.

178. See text accompanying note 173 supra (exemptions pursuant to art. X).
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CONCLUSION

Since its inception the Central American Common Market has demonstrated an awareness of the dangers inherent in diverse fiscal incentives to
industrial development and in their unilateral concession. The pertinent agreements and the Executive Council's action sought uniformity of incentives and
their multilateral application. However, until the Agreement on Fiscal Incentives and its Protocol became effective, the regional effort was piecemeal and
limited to the protection of regional products. With the effectuation of the
Agreement and its Protocol, the Executive Council can develop a coherent
policy of regional industrialization and assure free trade, rational industrialization, fair competition, and the optimal use of scarce resources - all hitherto
adversely affected by national incentives.
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